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438 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW
V. FRAUD AND ABUSE
TIM RAVICH: The next segment is going to deal with fraud and abuse. [This
panel is occupied by] two gentlemen from out of town and a local legal
practitioner. I will start with the gentleman in the middle.
MARK LANGDON works for the law firm Arent Fox Kintner Plotkin &
Kahn in Washington, D.C. as an associate in the health care group. Mr.
Langdon's practice has focused primarily on the representation of health care
providers such as nursing homes, health agencies, and physicians on a wide
range of issues including fraud and abuse counseling, federal and state health
care fraud investigations, federal and state regulatory compliance, corporate
practice of medicine, Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement. Mr. Langdon
regularly advises clients on structuring provider joint ventures, integrated
delivery systems, and other health care business arrangements to comply with
federal and state fraud and abuse laws. Mr. Langdon has participated in
negotiations on behalf of providers for the Office of the Inspector General, the
Health Care Financing Administration and various state Medicaid fraud
control units. The gentleman to Mark's immediate left is Eric Tower.
ERIc TOWER works for Mintz, Levin Cohn Ferris Glovsky & Popeo, P.C.
in Washington, D.C. He is an associate in their healthcare law section. His
practice encompasses a wide variety of transactional and regulatory matters,
including mergers and acquisitions, joint ventures, contracting, reimburse-
ments, certificate of need, licensure, managed care, federal and state provider
regulation, fraud, and abuse. Eric has worked exclusively with health care law
since 1992. He has represented a wide variety of health care providers and
manufacturers. Eric earned his B.A. with honors from Northwestern
University, his J.D., cum laude from the University of Wisconsin and his
LL.M. in health law from the Loyola University Chicago School of Law.
Next, ERIC ROTH. Mr. Roth is a graduate of the Georgetown University
Law Center. Mr. Roth is an associate in the Miami office of White & Case.
Mr. Roth is a litigator whose areas of practice include general commercial
litigation, bankruptcy litigation, admiralty litigation in both the state and
federal courts. [Mr. Roth] has practiced before administrative agencies and
[engaged in] appellate work in the federal and state courts including the
Florida Supreme Court.
With that, I will turn [it] over to you. Mark.
MARK LANGDON: O.K. Thanks. First I'd like to thank Tim Ravich and the




What I'm going to talk about... I am going to present a general overview
of federal health care fraud and abuse. And I'm going to go over some of the
statutes that impact a number of providers and physicians. Eric [Tower], on
my left, will be talking about the anti-kickback statute in some detail. And
Eric [Roth], on my right, will be talking about compliance plans as he has
some has experience with investigations. I have some hand outs, I hope
people grab those...
First of all I want to talk about the general health care enforcement
environment today. As many of you know from reading articles in the news-
paper about Columbia/HCA and various other investigations have been going
on, - it's a very aggressive health care enforcement environment today.
Janet Reno, several years ago, declared health care fraud to be the number two
initiative, just behind violent crimes, to the Department of Justice. And also,
as I indicated in the outline, the General Accounting Offices estimate that as
much as $100 billion is being lost every year to health care fraud and abuse.
That's a pretty high sum, so providers have to be keenly aware of all the
statutes that come into play when they are trying to structure arrangements.
Another thing is there have been a number of very aggressive prosecutors and
assistant U.S. district attorneys who have been trying to advance some very
novel theories in going after physicians and other providers. That's something
we also need to be concerned about. And as I think Eric [Roth] may talk
about ... in some detail later. There is a recent case in Kansas City whereby
some health care attorneys were indicted and these were well-respected fraud
attorneys.' And they were indicted. Basically, it was believed they were
conspiring to violate the anti-kickback statute because they were giving
advice, allegedly to help their clients try to structure arrangements that were
in violation of the law. The case was recently dismissed. That just shows
how it's a very heightened and very aggressive environment today.
Basically, in my opinion, there are three main weapons the government
can use to go after healthcare providers. First, one is the Federal Civil False
Claims Act;2 second is the Federal Anti-Kickback Statute;3 and the last one
is the Stark law, it's called Federal Physician Self-Referral Law, which was
named after [California Representative] Pete Stark and it's called the Stark
law.'
Let me go through the False Claims Act first and if anybody has any
questions along the way just holler, stop and I will try to answer those. The
United States v. Anderson, No. 98-20030-01, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1730, (D. Kan. Jan. 8,
1999).
2 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1999).
3 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b) (1999).
4 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (1999).
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False Claims Act - mainly because of the enormous penalties that can be
imposed on providers is probably the government's most powerful weapon in
this fight against fraud and abuse. Basically what it provides is that it is a civil
offense to present a false claim to the government or to cause a false claim to
be presented to the government and you have to knowingly present it to the
government and it has to be false or fraudulent. What that means basically is
that there is no specific intent standard that's required; it's not a criminal
statute. The government needs to show there was actual knowledge or
deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information that was
presented within the claim. The main examples of the application of the False
Claims Act are when a doctor submits a bill to the Medicare program for
services that either were never provided or provided but weren't medically
necessary. Another example is if a doctor claims a reimbursement code on the
claim form but it was actually a higher code than what the service should have
been coded into. The main penalties that can be imposed upon providers for
violation of this act are treble the actual damages. So, in other words, if the
government suffered $10,000, you would multiply by three - that can be an
enormous sum - and then $5,000 to $10,000 per claim that's submitted to the
government. In other words, every time a physician submits a claim to the
government, the physician submits ten claims a month or a hundred - you
would multiply that by $10,000, plus three times the actual damage, you could
get some enormous sums that can be levied against the providers. And
because of this there is an obvious incentive for providers instead of going
[...] to litigate these cases, there is an incentive to settle with the government.
And also there is a provision that was enacted to the 1986 amendments to the
False Claims Act which allowed qui tam relaters to basically bring an action
in the name of the government as well as in the name of himself against a
provider and lots of times these qui tam relaters work for the provider, like
work for the hospital and they somehow uncovered that the hospital may have
been doing something fraudulently, like billing for services that weren't
provided. And that person can go to the government, disclose what he/she
knows and they can get up to 30% of the funds that are eventually awarded.
There's obviously a huge incentive to go to become a relater, blow the whistle
on the company and try and get a large sum of money back.
The second statute I'd like to talk about is the Federal Anti-Kickback
Statute. It's a criminal statute which basically prohibits the offer or the receipt
of any type of remuneration that is intended to induce the referral of patients
whose services would be covered by a federal health care program and also,
which is intended to induce the purchase, order or lease of any items or
services that are reimbursable by a federal health insurance program. Again,
the penalties for this statute are very severe: five years imprisonment or
$25,000 fine - and one of the most important penalties are that you can be
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excluded from all federal health insurance programs since a number of nursing
homes and home-health agencies depend very heavily on getting money from
Medicare and Medicaid. This could provide a huge incentive to make certain
that the appropriate compliance measures are in place so that the other
arrangements with the other providers are [in compliance with] the statute.
There are a number of what are called, safe harbors to this kick-back
statute. If you're structuring a transaction and the transaction fully qualifies
for a safe harbor - that means basically that you are guaranteed immunity
from prosecution. ... Later there's been - some people say there's been a
split in the government. The Department of Justice has indicated that even if
an arrangement meets a safe harbor, they can, if they want to, try to look
behind the safe harbor and say that in essence it was actually a sham
transaction that was designed to meet a safe harbor, but in reality the parties
are trying to make payments for referrals. So, it's very important to make
certain that you can structure the transaction to fit into a safe harbor and make
certain that you're continually monitoring the arrangement to make certain
that the payments continue to fit within that safe harbor. What's very
significant about the anti kick-back statute is that it's criminal, so even if you
don't fall into a safe harbor, since it is an intent-based statute, the government
has to prove intent. And basically that's a fact-and-circumstances type test
that the government has to prove that payments were being made with a
purpose to induce referrals.
... Providers... have the option of trying to seek an advisory opinion
from the government. Oftentimes hospitals want to run into relationships with
physicians and they don't know whether the kick-back statute has been
implicated or not. And a couple of years ago, the advisory opinion process
was adopted and that means that providers can submit a request to the Office
of the Inspector General at the Department of Health and Human Services and
they can outline their proposed arrangement. And the Office of the Inspector
General will, hopefully, give an opinion as to whether they think that that
transaction will implicate the statute or not. There are obviously a number of
drawbacks with going forward with it request[ing] for an opinion because
once you get the opinion, you're stuck with it. There's always a chance that
the government might say "No." So, if you try to do it later on, you're
obviously going to subject yourself to various penalties. That's basically the
anti-kick back statute and as I mentioned. Eric [Tower] is probably going to
go into a little more detail about its application.
The last statute I'd like to touch upon is... this is a statute that I'm sure
a number of physicians are familiar with - the Stark law. Basically, the
amendments to the Stark law went into effect January 1st of 1995. To my
knowledge, I'm not aware of any enforcement actions that have been taken by
the federal government against hospitals or other physicians or other providers
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for violating the Stark law. But last year in January of 1998, proposed
regulations were set forth by HCFA and those regulations will probably be
finalized in another year or two, and once they are finalized I think we will see
an increase in enforcement actions being taken against providers in violation
of the statute.
Let me just run through the basics of the statute. The statute prohibits a
physician who has a financial relationship with an entity from referring a
Medicare, Medicaid patient to that entity for the furnishing of certain types of
services unless that relationship qualifies for an exception. Again, the
penalties are very severe. Up to $15,000 for each service, forfeiture of any
reimbursement of services that were provided based upon the unlawful referral
and also potential exclusion for Medicare and Medicaid. And the basic policy
objective behind both the Stark law and the anti kick-back statute is that the
government feels that if a physician has a financial relationship with an entity,
that will make the physician more likely to order unnecessary services from
that entity instead of looking after the best interest of the patient. And there
have been a number of government studies, one by the General Accounting
Office several years ago and that is why these statutes needed to be adopted.
One of the main differences between the Stark law and the anti kick-back
statute is that as I mentioned, the anti kick-back statute is intent based, so
therefore, the government needs to prove that there was an intent to violate the
statute. Under the Stark law, intent is irrelevant. So whether the parties have
good intentions or not, what matters is if you violate the statute and you do not
meet an exception, then basically, - can be imposed, but as I mentioned, to
date there aren't many enforcement actions taken.
And what I'd like to do now, is give you a real quick example of how, in
my opinion, how absurd the application of the Stark law can become. We
represent a lot of opthamologists and this example is actually on page 9 of the
handout, it's number 3. Basically, if a Medicare patient receives cataract
surgery, and then receives eye-glasses that are prescribed by an opthamologist
after the surgery, Medicare covers eye-glasses only when they're furnished
after cataract surgery, so this would obviously be a Medicare-covered service.
Let's assume that the opthamologist owns an optical shop, which is very
typical today. What would happen is that the opthamologist would perform
the cataract surgery. The opthamologist would refer the patient downstairs in
the optical shop for the glasses. Basically, this arrangement implicates the
Stark law because we have a physician, the opthamologist who's referring a
patient to an entity which is the optical shop, with which the opthamologist
has a financial relationship with and the only applicable exception would be
the "in-office ancillary services" exception. And what that means is that the
opthamologist for another physician in his practice would have to directly
supervise the furnishing of the glasses to that particular patient. That sounds
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very absurd because opticians are the ones that are licensed under state law to
do this, but under a literal reading of the Stark law, the arrangement I just
described - the opthamologist or the other physician did not directly
supervise the furnishing of the glasses. So it's a violation of the Stark law.
Now whether the opthamologist has to be present while all the glasses are
furnished or whether he can be upstairs performing surgery, that's unclear
right now, but, the fact that the opthamologist is not in the same building when
this is being performed would constitute a violation of the Stark law and
shows how far reaching this particular law can be.
Last, I just want to touch upon briefly on what I think are the key issues
in the future with health care fraud and abuse. I think that with very
aggressive prosecutors we are going to continue to see a very heightened
enforcement environment. I think we'll see a number of qui tam relaters blow
a whistle on their companies and try to get a chunk of the recovery. As I
mentioned before, once the Stark law proposed regulations are finalized, I
think we'll see the government start to target physicians and other providers,
and I think we will also see an increase in enforcing in the managed care
arena. As most of you know, under traditional Medicare fee-for-service
service, the incentives are for over-utilization because basically the more
services that you provide, the more you get paid. But under the managed care
arena, it's the opposite, the incentives are for under-utilization and we have
quality of care issues that are raised. I know the DOJ is currently undergoing
a number of investigations with managed care companies in the country right
now. One of the things they are targeting when the HMOs either enroll or dis-
enroll people based upon their health status and that sometimes they'll
conduct marketing campaigns, they'll call up Medicare patients and try to find
out basically how sick they are, decide whether to sign them up based on that
decision, and I think that's a violation of federal law, and I think we will see
an increase in enforcement in that area as well. So that's a basic overview of
fraud and abuse and think Eric [Tower] will go into more detail on the
kickback statute.
ERIC TOWER: Mark [Langdon] ... covered the basics. Basically with
respect to the anti kick-back statutes, it's an extremely broad statute, but it's
important to keep in mind that it basically covers every transaction that you
can imagine. Any payments between professionals, any time you lease space,
any time you lease equipment, any time a provider is getting a rebate or a
discount, free goods, incentive payments between hospitals and physicians,
any time you purchase an interest in a health care provider, there is a good
chance that it could be implicated. If you're providing a bundle of goods and
services to a health care provider and you're a manufacturer, you've
potentially got an issue there. [... ] And one thing that lately has been coming
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up a little bit is hospitals providing courtesy services to physicians and a
medical staff and that sort of thing. And again, that might, or might not fall
within the statute. And [if] you're wondering why I'm saying "might or might
not," that's because the statute itself is extremely vague. It doesn't really have
definitions in the sense that we'd all like it, it doesn't define the concept of
inducing referrals, for example. So there are two problems to the statute.
There is a problem that prohibits remuneration in return for referrals. You
guys would probably think of that as getting paid a bundle of cash in return for
making a referral to someone. That's pretty clearly prohibited [... ]. The
other problem picks up remuneration intended to reduce referrals and that's
where most people get into trouble, because anytime you've got a relationship,
it's very hard to determine what the underlying purpose of that is.
Obviously, people want a relationship; it's beneficial to both parties and
in the real world, people want to make money off it. Well, there are some
rabid dogs at [the Office of the Inspector General] that say, basically, any time
you've got any sort of relationship here within the anti kick-back statute, -
and quite frankly, they'd like to throw everyone in jail. I've had some very
interesting talks with people there. So that's sort of the broad-brush stroke.
It's important to keep in mind that the statutes here are, in part, being enforced
due to lack of political will-power. There's only so much money, health care
costs are rising, and our politicians don't really want to trim back on benefits
and a lot of times they're too scared to trim back on provider payments, so
what we do and I know Eric [Roth] will go a little more into that is that we
will hit them over the head with a lot of criminal penalties and set them
straight. [...].
Obviously, there are the statutes, there are regulations, case law, I've
given you guys all some of that. The OIG has implemented an advisory
opinion process pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and the
Accountability Act ("HIPAA"),' and that's been interesting because that
allows providers to immunize themselves from prosecution by the OIG under
the anti kick-back statutes. Normally that doesn't affect the DOJ's ability to
prosecute you, I might add, and that's kind of a big deal. One of the effects
of the advisory opinion process, -just sort of as an aside - it's made the
anti kick-back statute kind of a nice weapon. Because, if you can submit a
request for an advisory opinion, regarding a competitor's practice - say
you're going to implement it yourself and get a negative response and you can
sit there and wave it in front of the other parties, they're not going to be too
happy with their business partners. And if you get a positive response, just go
ahead and do it yourself then. It's kind of nice.
5 Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996).
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The government has also published a series on fraud alerts and
management advisories on joint ventures and prescription drug managing,
hospital incentives, [ . . .] in nursing homes, durable medical equipment,
waiver of co-payment and deductibles and arrangements for the provision of
clinical lab services, such as free flabotomists or nurses or that sort of thing.
So obviously the statute is broad. There are also some informal letters. I just
got done writing one myself. We'll submit an informal request to the OIG,
setting forth a practice that we believe is illegal, and get a nice letter back
saying, "Gee, that's a problematic practice." And then we can wave that
around too. [...].
You can also find out what's going on to a degree by just calling up
people at the OIG and asking them. That's gotten a little tougher. When I was
going to speak here, I called someone at the OIG and I said, "Hey, give me
something to say, I'll say anything." And they said, "No, you've got to send
a request in triplicate and ship it to our public affairs office, and we might or
might not give you a quote." And they also refused to even allow me to say
[what] their name is. That shows you how concerned they are about these
issues. There are also miscellaneous authorities, there's stuff posted on the
internet regarding negotiated rule-making, or the managed care safe harbors.
One of the problems that we have with the statute is that it's vague and there's
constant tension between the Office of the Inspector General that wants very
broad definitions and a lot of discretion to kind of prosecute whatever they see
as being fraud and providers who want clear guidance. The problem is that
every time the OIG says something, people take it and kind of run with it, find
holes in it, find ways around it, and that's like the Stark amendment for
example. HCFA has prohibitions on beneficiary inducement now because of
holes in the anti kick-back statute. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 requires
disclosures, financial relationships between hospitals and home health
agencies when you're going to refer to what a hospital is going to refer. And
that's all in response to perceived holes in the anti- kickback statute.
I gave you guys a copy of the Kansas City litigation.6 You can look
through that. Basically, all [the court] was saying was, "Gee, this statute is so
vague, you know, how can anyone realistically have any guidance here?" And
I think that's true. To a degree, the OIG has done that themselves. They've
defined, in the past, the concept of "induce" under the statute as, "to lead,
move, by influence or persuasion." It's extremely broad. Basically, if I give
Mark [Langdon] a pen, and it says, "Pharmacy Company X," I've violated the
anti kick-back statute, right, that's pretty broad. People have tried to be
6 See supra note 1.
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reasonable. A very large court case called HanlesterNetwork v. Shalala,7 said
that "induce is to bring out or about, to effect, to influence, to cause or to act
on" [... ] - took the Black's law dictionary definition. It said that, "induce
is nowhere defined simply by reference, to influence, or encouragement.
Induce connotes an intent to exercise influence over reason orjudgment." It's
a higher standard, in other words, and there's this tension because the OIG
wants to be able to get you for absolutely anything you can do. And the
problem is that courts are starting to get a little resistant to that, but again I
point you to the Kansas City indictment as being an example of the OIG going
a little too far.'
The policy underlying the statutes - I guess there's five major
considerations. There's cost. The statute is implemented when providers
were essentially cost-based and as I discussed we made a political decision to
reduce cost by labeling practices fraudulent. Access is a concern, and the
theory is that people entered to exclusive relationships because there's money
flowing between the parties and that might impact patient care, which is
another concern. Quality and interfering with medical judgment of physicians
is a concern. Asymmetry of information is a concern. Fraud can be hard to
spot, especially when there's a medical decision involved. The anti kick-back
statute gives a weapon that allows the government to prosecute you for
violating the statute without having to prove that you made an inappropriate
medical judgment. Government, - FBI agents are not too qualified to
determine if care is medically necessary, but they can sure nail you under the
statute. And uncertainty. The government doesn't know what's hanging on
out there. They won't know what's going on in the real world. But the anti-
kickback statute gives them a weapon to fight back fraud.
I gave you guys a quick overview, an analysis of how the statute works.
Does it apply? Does the situation you're in fit under a safe harbor exception?
Realistically, it almost never does. So you're left with the facts-and-
circumstances analysis; you're in "never never land." You don't know if
you're going to get prosecuted or not. When you fall into that "never-never
land," you've got to take into account a series of factors, financial harm. For
example, managed care programs, there might be less potential financial harm,
but there might be a risk that you're swapping, so what you might be doing is
giving a discount to managed care patients in order to pick up Medicare
business and that's kind of a big issue.
Another risk factor is that you're substantially in compliance with the safe
harbor - that goes to the intent of the parties. Changes in the utilization
51 F.3d 1390 (9th Cir. 1990).
9 See supra note 1.
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levels: If there's going to be an increase in the business between the parties,
that could be a red flag for a care intermediary to bust you. Also, if you're in
an industry that's growing rapidly, you've got to be a little more careful, and
that's just a pragmatic concern. Impact on access to care is a concern.
Informants: The OIG gets people ratting on their competitors all the time.
That can be fun. Enforcement Activity: If the government is cracking down
on your industry around a particular practice, you've got to be more careful.
You've got keep an eye on the OIG work plan, special fraud alerts. Resources
are an issue; if the government doesn't have the resources to delve in and
uncover your particular arrangement because it's complicated, there's less of
a chance you're going to get nailed. The risk of liability: How likely is a
court or administration body to conclude that someone's knowingly or
willfully engaged in the conduct that violates the statute? [...]
Impact on quality: ... some practices can actually increase quality. Some
form of companies provide disease management services to managed care
entities use for example. State statutes you should be concerned with: the
states have parallel statutes for the anti-kickbacks. Some are all payor; those
are important. Practical factors: how far out does the OIG or DOJ want to be
seen as going? They don't want to go out on a limb and ban something that's
completely common in the industry if it's really not harming care. And that's
a political concern as well. In the profile the entity or the practice involved
if the OIG can get a multi-state big reward settlement they might be inclined
to go after someone. Visit Columbia/HCA getting nailed for stuff plenty of
other people have done. No one has really complained about it. There's also
a concept that they like and that's holding someone out as an example and
beating them up in public to kind of scare everyone else off. Finally I'd point
out that in a transaction the anti-kickback statute - because it's so vague, can
be a tool to leverage negotiation. If you can point out to the other side ways
that their agreement is structured, it might need a little more work. Sometimes
you can negotiate more favorable terms for your client on the argument that
you are assuming a little more risk. And I'll stop it right there.
ERIc ROTH: O.K. Thanks. Well I'm going to talk a little bit first about
compliance programs given the growth of the managed health care industry,
the competitiveness within the industry and the fact that the difficulties
encountered in understanding these statutes may cause companies or their
employees to run afoul of them and get them in trouble.
One of the best prophylactic measures a company can take is to implement
a compliance program under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. Having
this type of program in place will help substantially to mitigate the penalties
and fines that the company may incur if it has been found to have violated one
of the statutes or other statutes that we have been talking about. In order to be
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considered a compliance program, the program must be designed to prevent
and detect violations of the law. And the company must exercise due
diligence in seeking to prevent and detect criminal activity. So, they must
establish a system, a corporate-wide system, of standards and procedures by
which employees are expected to abide. There must be specific individuals
within the company who are assigned the responsibility to oversee compliance
with the established standards of conduct. Another one of the requirements
for a compliance program is that the Company not delegate the oversight
responsibility to somebody who it knows or should know has propensity to
engage in illegal activity. It sounds kind of obvious but that's one of the
requirements.
The organization must also take steps to effectively communicate the
standards and procedures to all the employees. One of the ways we do this is
making sure that the company will hold training programs for employees to
learn what the standards of conduct the company expects are. Other ways to
do this are to disseminate written materials to the employees. Oftentimes we
will do both. The organization must take reasonable steps to achieve
compliance with these standards by setting up monitoring and auditing
systems within its own company to detect any violations or detect things that
are running afoul of any of the statutes we talked about. And, upon finding
any violations, it must take actions or have in place methods or mechanisms
by which it can enforce some discipline, whether it be through termination,
suspension, etc. And the Company must take reasonable steps or have
reasonable steps in place to ensure that it does do something to prevent further
violations of the various laws.
The precise acts or programs within the compliance program depend upon
several factors, - the size of the program, the prior history of the organization
[and] whether the organization is in a business that has a particular risk of
violations. For example, to go outside of the health care industry, if you have
a company dealing with toxic waste, - you know disposal of toxic waste is
likely to be an issue that is one that they need to be looking out and focusing
their compliance program on. Here we have been talking about the anti-
kickback statute. The conduct prohibited by that statute should be a focus of
a compliance program.
The benefits of, as I started out by referring to, - the benefits of having
a compliance program in place, to begin with, are that it will severely limit or
reduce the liability of the company. Or, in the event the Company is found
liable, it will severely reduce or limit the penalty that it suffers. And some
case law suggests that not only the company but its board of directors can be
held liable for violations when they have not had sufficient compliance
programs in place to monitor and find out what kind of activities are going on.
Obviously having the program in place will help to deter misconduct by
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employees. It also will help with the prosecutorial decisions if the company
can show it has done everything it possibly could to prevent the misconduct.
Prosecutors might want to look somewhere else where there have been more
blatant violations; in a company that had no oversight capacity whatsoever.
And another thing, not only is it good to have a compliance program from the
standpoint of employee morale but also for the sake of reputation within the
community as being a health care company that's at the forefront of policing
itself in order to avoid potential problems.
[...]
We have had occasion to set up [...] compliance programs. I think the
impetus for setting them up has been - there have been some problems.
They recognize, I guess, it's kind of a slap in the face. They recognize they
need to do something and make sure they have got something in place that
they can point to in the event something really serious happens. Not that what
we've discussed wasn't serious, but it never really mushroomed out. So, no
we haven't had any resistance from people saying no I don't want to spend the
time, effort and money to establish one. It's really not that difficult to
establish it, it's another thing to make sure it's properly implemented. The
bigger the organization perhaps the more effort it takes to implement one and
make sure its effective.
TIM RAVICH: [...]
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